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Example: returning to the above example, of $220,000
of machinery loans secured by a mortgage on land owned
jointly by husband and wife, only $110,00 would be
deductible as a mortgage on the jointly owned land.
However, the other $110,000 should be deductible as a
claim against the estate if the decedent was personally liable
on the obligation. Thus, if the husband's name appears on
the note, the other half of the note balance should be
deductible as a claim against the estate. Of course, had the
obligation been secured by the machinery items, the entire
amount would have been deductible in the husband's estate
assuming the machinery was in the husband's name.
In conclusion
The obvious lesson from all of this is that it is important
how obligations are structured if a deduction for federal
estate tax purposes is desired. To obtain a full deduction,
the safest approach is to secure obligations by assets owned
by the individual for whom the deduction is anticipated.
FOOTNOTES
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION. When the plaintiff purchased the
disputed property, a fence separated the plaintiff’s land
from the neighbors' land and the plaintiff believed that the
fence was the actual boundary. The plaintiff used the land
for pasturing cattle and the cattle did roam over the land up
to the fence. The plaintiff and the defendant’s predecessor
in interest both contributed to the maintenance of the fence
and the fence was treated as the boundary. After the
defendant purchased the neighboring land, a survey
indicated that the true boundary was inside the land
occupied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed ownership
of the disputed strip by adverse possession for over 10
years. The defendant argued, and the trial court ruled, that
the plaintiff’s possession was not sufficiently open because
the defendant, or the predecessor in interest, could not see
the cattle on the disputed strip when the defendant was in
the defendant’s house. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the plaintiff had already obtained title to the land by
adverse possession by the time the defendant acquired the
neighboring property and that the pasturing of cattle was
sufficient open and notorious use to constitute adverse
possession. Davis v. Parke, 898 P.2d 804 (Or. Ct. App.
1995).
ANIMALS
CATTLE. The plaintiff was the wife of the son of the
defendant who owned and operated a farm and ranch. The
plaintiff was injured while helping the defendant, the
plaintiff’s husband, and the defendant’s other son herd stock
cattle to a new pasture. The plaintiff was inexperienced at
moving cattle and was trampled by a stray cow while
attempting to move the cow to the pasture. The plaintiff
sued for negligence in keeping, harboring and transporting
the cow and in failing to warn and instruct the plaintiff
about handling stock cows. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant knew that the
cow had any dangerous propensities. The court held that
such proof was not required in an action for negligence and
that the trial court had sufficient evidence to find negligence
in this case. Sybesma v. Sybesma, 534 N.W.2d 355 (S.D.
1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. Within two months before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor conveyed the homestead to the
debtor’s son for “love and affection” at a time when the
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debtor was insolvent and the debtor had $27,000 of equity
in the house. The debtor did not list the house on the
bankruptcy property schedules or claim the homestead as
exempt. The trustee learned about the transfer and told the
debtor to list any interest in the house. Three days later the
son conveyed the house back to the debtor for “love and
affection.” The debtor then claimed a homestead exemption
for the house. The trustee sought denial of the exemption
because the property was recovered by the trustee and the
property had been fraudulently conveyed by the debtor. The
debtor argued that the property was not “recovered by the
trustee” because the trustee had not filed any formal motion
to recover the house. The court held that the debtor’s
homestead exemption would be denied because the
conveyance of the house to the son was a voidable
preferential transfer and was recovered by the estate
through the trustee’s actions. In re Glass, 60 F.3d 565 (9th
Cir. 1995), aff’g, 164 B.R. 759 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtor claimed monthly
social security disability payments of $900 as exempt and
excluded the payments from the disposable income
available to fund the Chapter 13 plan, which provided only
3 percent payment of unsecured claims. The exemption was
allowed but the trustee argued that the payments should
have been included in disposable income. Citing In re
Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) and In re
Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994), the court
held that the disability payments must be included in
determining disposable income during the plan. In re
Hagel, 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’g, 171
B.R. 686 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The IRS had filed secured and unsecured
claims for taxes two days after the bar date for filing claims,
even though the IRS had received proper notice of the bar
date. The IRS offered no excuse for the late filing and
argued that Section 502 did not provide for disallowance of
untimely filed claims. The court held that the untimely filed
claims were barred as untimely filed. In re Marsiat, 184
B.R. 846 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had filed four previous
bankruptcy cases which were dismissed because of the
debtors’ failure to complete in a timely manner the
bankruptcy requirements. The debtors sought a
determination that tax claims for periods more than three
years before the current bankruptcy filing were
dischargeable. The IRS argued that the three year period of
Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(i) and 523(a)(1)(A) should be
equitably tolled by the previous bankruptcy filings. The
debtors argued that the previous filings were not tax
motivated and were made to prevent foreclosure against the
homestead. The court held that the tax claims were not
dischargeable because the three year period for priority tax
claims was equitably tolled since the previous filings
occurred soon after tax notices were sent, the debtors had
funds to pay the taxes, and the IRS made tax collection
attempts during the times between the filings. In re Clark,
184 B.R. 728 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995).
CONTRACTS
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. The plaintiff was a seller of
wholesale farm equipment and had sold a “rolling basket
crumbler” to the defendant retailer of farm equipment. The
original sales contract required payment within one month
of delivery. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s agent
had orally represented that the defendant would not have to
pay for the crumbler if the equipment did not sell and that
the plaintiff would accept return of the crumbler in lieu of
payment. The court held that the evidence of the oral
modification of the written sales agreement would not be
allowed because the oral agreement contradicted the
payment terms in the written contract. When the crumbler
was delivered, the defendant discovered that it would not fit
on a particular cultivator. The defendant notified the
plaintiff and the plaintiff made modifications which adapted
the crumbler to fit the cultivator. Because the modifications
took some time, the plaintiff had agreed in writing to extend
the payment date to one year later or upon sale. The
defendant argued that the failure of the crumbler to fit the
cultivator was a breach of implied warranty. The court held
that the evidence demonstrated that the defendant had not
timely sought rejection and return of the equipment as not
complying with the contract. Instead, the defendant had
accepted the modifications and new payment terms and was
obligated to pay for the crumbler as agreed in the written
contracts. Whelchel Co. v. Ripley Tractor Co., 900
S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. App. 1995).
The plaintiff operated a turkey farm and had contracted
with the defendant to raise turkeys which would be
purchased by the defendant, raised by the plaintiff and
shipped to the defendant’s processing plants. The plaintiff
sued for breach of contract when the defendant stopped
providing turkeys. The plaintiff alleged that the parties
orally agreed to continue the arrangement so long as the
plaintiff performed satisfactorily. The defendant argued that
the oral modification of the written contract was not
enforceable because the oral terms would not be performed
within a year. The court held that the oral modification
terms created a contract terminable at will; therefore, the
statute of frauds did not apply. However, the court held that
the term of the oral contract was for a reasonable period in
order for the plaintiff to recover its initial investment in
equipment. The court also held that the integration clause in
the written contract did not prevent consideration of oral
modifications because the written contract omitted several
aspects of the arrangement, indicating that the parties did
not consider the written contract to cover all aspects of the
arrangement. Center State Farms v. Campbell Soup Co.,
58 F.3d 1030 (4th Cir. 1995).
USURY. The debtor was a grain broker who purchased
crops from farmers over several years on a “forward
contract” basis. Under the contracts, the debtor paid
“premiums” for the periods during which amounts due
under the contracts were not paid. The court described the
arrangements as investment accounts under which the
“premiums” were actually interest on the amounts left with
the debtor. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy trustee sought to void the amounts due under the
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contracts, arguing that the contracts were usurious under
Minn. Stat. § 334.021. The farmers argued that the
premiums on the deferred payment contracts were not
usurious because the contracts were supposed to be with the
grain companies who purchased the grain from the debtor
and there was no intent to evade the usury law at the
inception of the contracts. The farmers also argued that the
law did not apply because the contract amounts exceeded
$100,000. The court rejected the last argument because the
contracts exceeded $100,000 only if the alleged usurious
interest were included. The court held that an issue of fact
remained as to whether the contracts were with the debtor
or the grain companies. However, the court held that if the
contracts were with the debtor, the contracts were usurious
because the law required only an intentional using of an
usurious rate, whether or not the parties knew the rate was
usurious. The court held that if the contracts were
determined to be usurious, the trustee would be allowed to
avoid the contracts and collect from the farmers double the
interest charged. In re Donnay, 184 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1995).
CORPORATIONS
SHAREHOLDER SUIT. The plaintiff was a minority
shareholder in a closely held family corporation which
operated an electrical supply company. The plaintiff
brought suit against the majority shareholder for breach of
corporate fiduciary duties, alleging that the majority
shareholder was attempting to “freeze” the plaintiff out of
the plaintiff’s interest in the corporation by paying excess
salaries to other shareholders and family member
employees, substantially reducing dividend payments, firing
the plaintiff from employment with the company,
withholding corporate records from the plaintiff and barring
the plaintiff from the corporate premises. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff was required to bring a
shareholder’s derivative action on a claim for breach of
corporate fiduciary duty. The court acknowledged that
generally a shareholder was required to bring a derivative
action but the court held that an exception applied where
none of the reasons underlying the purposes of the
derivative action rule was present; therefore, a shareholder
in a three shareholder corproation could bring an action in
the shareholder’s own name against the corporation and
other shareholders. The court noted that there was no
danger of “multitudinous litigation” by separate
shareholders since there was only one other shareholder.
Barth v. Barth, 651 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The CFSA has adopted
as final regulations establishing the Disaster Set Aside
program for CFSA borrowers who operated a farm or ranch
in a federally declared disaster area in 1993. Under the
program, a distressed borrower may move the next
scheduled loan payment to the end of the loan term. 60 Fed.
Reg. 46753 (Sept. 8, 1995).
The appellant applied for a 1990 disaster payment based
on double-cropped squash acreage and the disaster benefits
were approved by the county committee. More than 90 days
after the acreage was certified by the appellant, an audit was
conducted by the state committee which concluded that the
double-cropped squash acreage did not meet the disaster
program requirements because no history of double-
cropping was shown. The appellant attempted to obtain the
county files for 1986, 1988 and 1989 but the county office
no longer had the files because the files were routinely
destroyed after five years. However, the records did show
approval for double-cropped disaster benefits for 1988. The
state determination was appealed to the National Appeals
Division of DASCO and was upheld, again based on the
failure of the appellant to show double-cropping history.
However, NAD found that the appellant did not provide any
false statements or misrepresentations in the application for
the 1990 disaster benefits. On further appeal to the Director
of NAD, the appellant was not required to reimburse the
benefits received because, under 7 C.F.R. § 780.17, the
county committee’s approval was not modified or appealed
within 90 days and the appellant had not made any false
statements or misrepresentations in the application. In re
Faircloth, NAD No. 95001774S, Sept. 8, 1995. Note: This
case was submitted by Frank Vann, counsel for appellant.
The Digest  welcomes submission of NAD or other
unpublished decisions.
EMERGENCY LOANS. The appellant was a family
farm corporation which applied for an emergency loan. The
loan was denied by the county committee on the basis that
the appellant had too much annual average income and too
much labor costs in order to qualify as a family farm under
7 C.F.R. §§ 1941.4, 1945.162(i). On appeal to the NAD, the
NAD held that Section 1941.4 had no income or labor cost
limitations but only provided that the farm have enough
income to sustain the family, pay debts and maintain the
property. The regulations also require that the farm owners
provide a substantial amount of the management and labor.
The NAD ruled that the loan could not be denied on the
basis of the amount of average annual labor costs. The NAD
ruling was upheld by the Director of NAD. In re James &
Harry Holton, Inc., NAD No. 95000915S, July 3, 1995.
Note: This case was submitted by Frank Vann, counsel for
appellant. The Digest welcomes submission of NAD or
other unpublished cases.
G I N S E N G . The defendants were charged with
violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371, et seq., for
the purchase and exportation of ginseng without the
certification and recordkeeping required by Ohio. Rev. Stat.
§ 1518.24. The defendants argued that the Lacey Act did
not apply to ginseng because ginseng was exempt, under 16
U.S.C. § 3371(h), as a common food item. After examining
various statutory and state and federal administrative
definitions of food and medicine, the court held that ginseng
was a food. The court also examined the incidence of
references to ginseng in cases and publications and held that
ginseng production and use were sufficiently widespread in
the United States and the world to be a “common” food;
therefore, ginseng was not a product governed by the Lacey
Act and the charges against the defendants were to be
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dismissed. United States v. McCullough, 891 F. Supp.
422 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
HERBICIDES. See Welchert v. American Cyanamid,
Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995) summarized under
Products Liaiblity.
MARKETING ORDERS. The appellants were
growers, handlers and processors of tree fruits in California.
The appellants challenged the generic advertising program
administered under the peach and nectarine marketing
orders. The appellants argued that the assessment of fees to
pay for the generic advertising was arbitrary and capricious
because the USDA Secretary did not justify the need for the
generic advertising compared to reliance on private and
individual advertising. The court held that assessment was
not arbitrary or capricious because the assessment rules
were based on recommendations from producers and
handlers and the annual assessments were similarly
approved by a committee of affected producers and
handlers. The appellants also argued that the fees violated
their First Amendment rights in forcing the appellants to
participate in the advertising campaigns. The court held that
the USDA failed to demonstrate that the advertising
program directly advanced a valid governmental interest or
that the advertising program was narrowly tailored to
advance the governmental interest; therefore, the
assessments for the advertising program violated the
appellants’ First Amendment right to not be forced to
financially contribute to the speech of others. The appellants
also challenged the assessment regulations as promulgated
without opportunity for notice and comment. The court
cited Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir.
1993), which involved a similar assessment program and
held that the assessments were validly made. The appellants
also challenged the maturity and size standards as arbitrary
and capricious but the court held that both sets of standards
were supported by sufficient evidence considered by the
USDA when the regulations were promulgated. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir.
1995).
RURAL HOUSING. The CFSA has adopted as final
regulations temporarily increasing the maximum population
of timber-dependent communities in the Pacific Northwest
for eligibility for water and waste disposal loans and grants,
community facilities loan, and local technical assistance and
planning grants. 60 Fed. Reg. 46215 (Sept. 6, 1995).
SWINE . The defendants purchased live hogs from
producers and sold the live hogs to slaughterhouses. The
defendants were approached by the FDA after several hogs
sold by the defendants were found to have excessive levels
of sulfamethazine in their tissues after slaughter. The FDA
requested that the defendants obtain written guarantees from
the producers that the hogs did not contain excessive
amounts of the sulfamethazine. The defendants failed to
obtain the written guarantees and the FDA brought an
action under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 332(a) for introduction of
adulterated food into interstate commerce. The defendants
argued that the live hogs were not food under the statutes.
The court noted that the definition of “food” in 21 U.S.C. §
321(f) was the circular “food is food” and was very broad
and the court examined the legislative history and the
history of FDA practice to determine whether the inclusion
of live hogs in the definition of food was reasonable. The
court held that based on long standing practice of the FDA
and the legislative history of a prior act, live hogs were food
subject to 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 332(a). The defendants also
argued that they did not “introduce” the hogs into interstate
commerce. The court held that the term “introduce into
interstate commerce” included the purchase and resale of
live hogs, because under Section 333(c)(2), persons who
purchase food for resale have a defense to a Section 331
violation if they obtain a written guarantee from the seller
of the food. U.S. Tuente Livestock, 888 F. Supp. 1416
(S.D. Ohio 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer and spouse created an
irrevocable trust with the taxpayer and spouse as income
beneficiaries. The trust had two individuals and one foreign
trust company as co-trustees.  The trust provided the
trustees with the discretion to distribute income and
principal as the “trustees see fit” and granted the trustees
authority to change all beneficial and administrative aspects
of the trust, subject to a veto by the taxpayer or spouse. The
taxpayer also had the power to make an inter vivos or
testamentary appointment of the trust property to members
of the taxpayer’s family, except the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s
creditors or the taxpayer’s estate. The IRS ruled that
because the taxpayer had a limited power of appointment
over  the trust, the taxpayer had the power to change the
beneficiaries of the trust; therefore, the taxpayer had
sufficient dominion and control over the property of the
trust to make the transfer of property to the trust an
incomplete gift. The IRS also ruled that a completed gift
would occur only when the taxpayer either relinquished the
right to appoint any particular trust property or when the
power was exercised. Ltr. Rul. 9535007, May 3, 1995.;
Ltr. Rul. 9536002, May 12, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s estate included an IRA which listed the
surviving spouse as primary beneficiary and a residuary
trust as the remainder holder, with the surviving spouse as
income beneficiary and trustee. The decedent’s will allowed
the surviving spouse as executor to split the residuary trust
into several trusts in order to make the QTIP and reverse
QTIP elections and to allocate property to a trust share for
use of the GSTT exemption amount. The surviving spouse
disclaimed the interest in the IRA as primary beneficiary
and split the trust into several shares for purposes of making
the QTIP and reverse QTIP elections. The trust required the
trustee to request distribution of all IRA income annually
and to make distribution of an amount equal to the IRA
income to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimer was effective and that the trust was eligible for
the QTIP election. The IRS also ruled that the trustee could
make a reverse QTIP election for a portion of the trust. The
IRS also ruled that the division of the trust into separate
subtrusts would not cause recognition of gain or loss to the
trust or estate. Ltr. Rul. 9537005, June 13, 1995.
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The decedent’s spouse had previously died, leaving a
residuary estate to a trust for the decedent. The trust
provided for quarterly payments of all trust income plus so
much of the trust corpus so that the decedent had at least
$10,000 per year in distributions. The trust allowed the
trustees to retain trust property “regardless of any lack of
diversification, risk or non-productivity” and to invest and
reinvest the trust corpus “without being limited by any
statute or rule of law concerning investments by trustees.”
The spouse’s estate originally claimed a marital deduction
for the trust property as QTIP but filed an amended return
after the death of the decedent which did not claim a marital
deduction and paid additional tax. The decedent’s estate
excluded the trust property from the decedent’s estate. The
estates argued that the trust did not qualify as QTIP because
the decedent’s right to receive income was limited by the
trustees’ authority not to invest the property for the greatest
income. The IRS cited Ill. Stat. ch 760, ¶ 5/3 which required
fiduciaries to prudently manage and invest trust property,
unless specifically excused by the trust instrument. The IRS
ruled that the trust did not expressly excuse the trustees
from the prudent investor rule; therefore, the decedent had
the power to enforce the prudent investor rule against the
trustees and to receive the maximum income from the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9537004, June 13, 1995.
SAVINGS BONDS. The decedent’s estate included
Series E and HH bonds and the decedent and estate used the
cash method of accounting. The decedent and estate did not
elect to report interest on the bonds each tax year. The
decedent’s will provided for bequests of partial interests in
the residuary estate to four eleemosynary institutions. The
estate representative elected to make cash distributions to
three of the institutions and distribution of the bonds to the
fourth. Under state law, the representative had the power to
make distribution in kind or in cash as is most practicable
and in the best interest of the distributees. The IRS ruled
that the distribution of the bonds under the residuary
bequests was not a disposition which caused recognition of
the interest accrued on the bonds as income in respect of
decedent, unless the estate makes the election, under I.R.C.
§ 454(a), to recognize the interest as income. Therefore, the
accrued interest would not be recognized until the bonds
were disposed of, redeemed or reach maturity or the legatee
makes an election under I.R.C. § 454(a). Ltr. Rul.
9537011, June 16, 1995.
TRANSFERS OF STOCK. The taxpayer was a
beneficiary of a trust initially established by the
beneficiary’s parent but funded with the beneficiary’s
separate property. The trustees were the other parent and a
bank. The trustees had the power to distribute income and
corpus of the trust. The beneficiary sold shares of stock to
the trust in exchange for a promissory note with an interest
rate adequate to not involve imputed interest under I.R.C. §
7872 and with the stock serving as security for the note. The
IRS ruled that the trust was a grantor owned trust and that
the taxpayer did not recognize gain or loss from the sale of
the stock to the trust nor would the trust be entitled to any
deduction from the interest paid on the note. The IRS also
ruled that if the principal of the note equaled the fair market
value of the stock, the sale of the stock did not result in a
gift subject to gift tax. The IRS also ruled that the sale of
the stock was not subject to the valuation rules of I.R.C. §
2702 so long as the promissory note was considered debt
and not equity in the corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9535026, May
31, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY. The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder and director of a corporation which owed
federal taxes. The shareholder caused the corporation to
liquidate by causing the corporation to make a liquidating
distribution to the shareholder and forgiving loans to the
shareholder. The court held that the taxpayer was liable for
the corporation’s tax deficiency since the distribution
caused the corporation to become insolvent and the loan
forgiveness further depleted the corporation’s assets.
Merriam v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-432.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer was an S
corporation which was engaged in the business of growing
and harvesting timber and subdividing and selling real
estate. The taxpayer granted a conservation easement to
some of its timberland to an organization described in
I.R.C. § 170(b)(a)(A)(vi). The property was used in the
taxpayer’s business for logging but much of the property
has been reforested or remained in its natural condition. The
taxpayer had built two residences on the property, one for a
caretaker and one used occasionally for business meetings.
The easement allowed the taxpayer to continue to log some
areas on a limited basis and in keeping with a forest
management plan to preserve the flora and fauna of the
area. The easement also allowed the taxpayer to raise crops
and graze animals on a limited basis and to use the property
for recreational hunting and fishing. Otherwise, the property
was not to be developed, mined or transferred except as
allowed under the easement agreement. The IRS ruled that
the conservation easement was eligible for a charitable
deduction because the easement was to be used exclusively
for a conservation purpose. The IRS refused to rule on the
issue of whether the property was held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of
calculating the amount of the charitable deduction. The IRS
also ruled that any charitable deduction would be passed
through to the shareholders.  Ltr. Rul. 9537018, June 20,
1995.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The taxpayer
purchased a 17th century bass viol for use in the taxpayer’s
profession as a musician. The taxpayer claimed a
depreciation deduction under ACRS. The IRS argued that
the bass was not eligible for depreciation because the bass
did not have a determinable life since the bass would only
appreciate in value as an historical art object. The court held
that the taxpayer was not required to prove a determinable
useful life for the bass. The court held that the bass was
eligible for ACRS depreciation because the bass was
tangible property used in a trade or business and was
subject to wear and tear from use during the taxable year.
Liddle v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,488
(3d Cir. 1995), aff’g, 103 T.C. 285 (1994).
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INDIANS. The taxpayer was an Eastern Band Cherokee
who owned a beneficial interest in land on the Cherokee
reservation. The taxpayer constructed an apartment complex
on the land and rented the apartments to members of the
Eastern Band Cherokee members. The taxpayer argued that
the rental income from the apartments was not subject to
federal income tax. The court held that only income derived
from the exploitation or use of the land itself was
nontaxable but the income derived from the improvements
on the land were taxable. Thus, the court noted that the
income from farming and timber harvesting were tax
exempt but the income from shops, motels and gas stations
were not exempt. The taxpayer also argued that the portion
of the rent which was attributable to the land was
nontaxable. The court held that the taxpayer failed to show
that any portion of the rental income was derived
specifically from the land; therefore, all of the rental income
was taxable. The taxpayer also argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment excluded American Indians from federal tax.
The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment language
referred to “Indians not taxed” in terms of counting Indians
exempt from state taxes for purposes of apportionment for
federal electoral representation. Beck v. Comm’r, 95-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,474 (4th Cir. 1995), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1994-122.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August
1995, the weighted average is 7.20 percent with the
permissible range of 6.48 to 7.85 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.48 to 7.92 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
48, I.R.B. 1995-36, 21.
RETURNS.  The IRS has announced the revision of
Publication 926 which explains the tax rules for employers
of domestic employees such as health aide, maid or nanny.
Ann. 95-73, I.R.B. 1995-37, 50.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.90 5.82 5.78 5.75
110% AFR 6.50 6.40 6.35 6.32
120% AFR 7.10 6.98 6.92 6.88
Mid-term
AFR 6.31 6.21 6.16 6.13
110% AFR 6.95 6.83 6.71 6.73
120% AFR 7.59 7.45 7.38 7.34
Long-term
AFR 6.77 6.66 6.61 6.57
110% AFR 7.46 7.33 7.26 7.22
120% AFR 8.15 7.99 7.91 7.86
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiffs were
vegetable farmers who planted vegetables on fields which
had been previously treated with a herbicide manufactureed
by the defendant. The label on the herbicide claimed that
vegetables could be planted on land treated with the
herbicide 18 months before the planting. The plaintiffs sued
for damages to their vegetable crops based on theories of
express and implied warranties. The trial court ruled that the
implied warranty action was preempted by FIFRA but that
the express warranty action was not preempted. The
appellate court reversed on the second holding. The court
held that the express warranty action arose out of language
on the label required under the FIFRA statute and EPA
regulations; therefore, the action was preempted by FIFRA.
Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th
Cir. 1995).
TRACTORS-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiff was injured
while hauling logs with a tractor manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiff sued in strict liability, alleging that
the tractor was defective because it did not have an operator
protective system (OPS) to prevent objects from entering
the operator’s area. The plaintiff presented evidence of the
number of accidents involving tractor rollovers and the
number of deaths and injuries involved. The plaintiff did
not present any qualifying evidence that any of the other
accidents involved tractors similar to the one involved in
this case or that the type of accident was similar. The court
held that the evidence was improperly allowed without
sufficient evidence that the accidents were substantially
similar to the plaintiff’s accident. The allowance of the
evidence of the prior accidents was sufficiently harmful to
require a new trial. Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158
(3d Cir. 1995).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION. The debtor was a dairy farm
partnership composed of two partners. The defendant
supplied feed on credit to the farm and when the defendant
learned that the debtor intended to sell its cows, the
defendant obtained a security interest in the cows. Only one
of the partners signed the security agreement in the
partner’s individual name. The plaintiff was another
creditor with an unperfected security interest in the cows
and argued that the defendant’s security interest was not
perfected because the agreement was not signed by both
partners and was not signed by the one partner as a
representative of the partnership. The court held that the
evidence demonstrated that the signing partner had the
authority to conduct partnership affairs and that the
signature as an individual was sufficient to perfect the
security agreement. The plaintiff also argued that the
description of the collateral was defective because it did not
identify the cows as belonging to the partnership. The
security agreement did identify the type of collateral and its
location on the farm; therefore, the court held that the
description was sufficient.  The plaintiff also argued that the
identification of the debtor in the security agreement was
defective because it listed only the names of the partners
“dba Grey Dawn Farms.” The court held that the
description of the debtor was sufficient. The court warned
that in all three aspects, the security agreement was not the
model of draftsmanship and was barely sufficient to perfect
the security agreement in this case. Mountain Farm Credit
Services v. Purina Mills, 459 S.E. 2d 75 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995).
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REPOSSESSION. The plaintiffs were farmers who had
defaulted on federal farm loans from the FmHA (now
CFSA). When the FmHA and other creditors attempted to
foreclose on the plaintiffs’ property, the plaintiffs filed for
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court lifted the automatic stay
as to the FmHA and other secured creditors to allow them
to repossess the collateral. The FmHA agents recovered
some mixed pigs which were in poor health and sold them
at a private sale to a local farmer because the next pig
auction was a substantial distance away and weeks later.
However, the plaintiffs did receive prior notice of the sale.
The FmHA also sold the farm equipment at an auction
about which the plaintiffs received prior written notice and
actual notice through newspaper advertisements. The
plaintiffs attended the auction and successfully bid on one
piece of machinery. The plaintiffs sued the FmHA in tort
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for violation of federal
regulations and statutes in repossessing and selling the
collateral without first informing the debtors of their loan
deferral rights. The court held that any FmHA tort liability
cannot be premised on  violation of federal statutes or
regulations but must be based on duties imposed by state
law. The court held that the FmHA was entitled to
repossess the collateral under the Bankruptcy Court order
lifting the stay and had disposed of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner with sufficient notice to
the plaintiffs. Love v. U.S., 60 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 1995),
aff’g, 844 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mont. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir.
1995) (valuation) see p. 92 supra.
Townsend v. U.S., 889 F. Supp. 369 (D. Neb. 1995)
(transfers within three years of death) see p. 86 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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